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Fields and Kauffeld (F&K) assert and presuppose that gossip is epistemically unreliable.
The following is one of many such claims in their paper:
Of course, as everyone knows, what gossip producers say is epistemically unreliable on
its face.
(Here's another:
Gossip producers openly accept responsibility for the truthfulness (or something very like
the truthfulness) and relevance of what they say, but they set such low standards for
discharging those responsibilities as to tolerate (almost invite) epistemically unreliable
discourse. Talk which merits evaluation as testimony should be constrained by higher
standards.)
This (alleged) datum is held to undermine the contrasting views of testimony of Fricker
and Coady, and so the unreliability claim is pivotal to F&K's paper. However, I argue that not
only does everyone not know that gossip is unreliable, but that no one knows it, since false.
Gossip is not essentially, necessarily, or characteristically unreliable. (In communities, where
gossip is unreliable, this is a merely local and contingent fact.)
I have another reason to concentrate on this pivotal claim of F&K's: Elsewhere (Adler,
2002: Ch.5) I argue for a default view of testimony, like that defended by Coady as well as Burge
(1993) and Brandom (1994). That is, the basic rule is that a hearer should accept a speaker's
assertion unless he has specific reason to object. But I also hold that the default is justified,
given our overwhelming background evidence of the reliability of testimony. If, though, gossip
was as F&K allege, it would be a problem for me too because I take testimony or assertion to be
governed by a requirement of truthfulness.
Borrowing from the ethnographer Jorg Bergmann, F&K tell us that the "communicative
activity of gossiping has the following features." Briefly:
1. "gossip typically requires a minimum of three parties. In Bergmann's terms these are the
gossip producer, the gossip recipient, and the gossip subject...."
2. "because of the manifest nature of its content, gossip implicates its participants in a
potentially reprehensible intrusion into the affairs of the parties who are the subject of the
gossip." The intrusion is of "private matters. This is the heart and source of gossip's ill
repute."
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3. "given the illicit character of the exchange something on the order of overt mutual
consent is required in order for a gossip conversation to get fully underway."
4. "Gossip producers typically represent what they have to say as: Communication
worthy..as unexpected, unconventional, juicy, strange, improper, immoral, eccentric."
I accept broadly this characterization. My main dissent is over the requirement of mutual consent,
which seems to me to hold only of gossiping, not gossip per se. In any case, I'll show later that
this condition is actually self-defeating for F&K's critique. Immediately after this
characterization, they observe:
The preceding account of the phenomenology of gossip shows that the nature of gossip is
readily apparent to gossipers and that it can be recognized as epistemically
unreliable...and it is typically backed by corroborating detail and quotations that serve
more to dramatize and heighten the entertainment value of the narrative than to lend
substance to the gossipy report. Small wonder that gossip is commonly regarded as
unreliable idle talk.
Certainly, then, gossip ought not qualify as testimony and does not deserve to be
evaluated as such.
I do not see how they take this to follow from 1-4 above. There is nothing in the central points-of unethical invasion of privacy--that implies or even suggests that gossip is generally or
essentially "epistemically unreliable." (Or, for that matter, that the gossiper is trying to
"dramatize and heighten the entertainment value...")
The most persuasive way to refute their pivotal presupposition is by example.
Unfortunately F&K offer almost none, so I'll do so.
1. Bill is going to be rejected by the club.
2. Marcia and Gary are splitting up.
3. Tony is having an affair.
4. The committee denied Fred's tenure.
5. Among schoolchildren: Johnny's socks don't match.
6. Lisa and Harry sleep in separate beds because Harry snores.
7. Smith is going to accept the job at Tech U.
8. Jones was pressured to resign because security found him drunk in his office.
9. Rick dropped out as a candidate because they could not get a job for his wife.
About these examples, I simply ask you to supply the appropriate context in which these would
constitute gossip. My assumption is that each of us is an expert or authority on the matter--it is
too basic, simple and pervasive a form of communicational practice for us not to grasp it well. I
now claim the following about these examples and I seek your corroboration: First, in the
context that you have envisaged, these constitute paradigm cases of gossip (and they could be
endlessly multiplied). Second, within those contexts, the speaker meets the conditions of
invasion and unethical behavior that F&K offer. Third, in envisaging circumstances in which
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persons assert 1-9 as gossip, they offer these assertions as they would standard cases of
testimony: they assert them as true. Fourth, and most crucial, you do not need to take these
assertions as epistemically unreliable, and in a variety of contexts, you wouldn't.
So far I have offered two objections to F&K's presupposition: First, nothing in an
adequate characterization of gossip requires epistemic unreliability. Second, when we reflect on
cases of gossip, like those above, we do not find it essentially or even typically unreliable.
Admittedly, on this second point, my criticism suffers an anomaly. The normal way to
test whether we, as hearers, regard a piece of testimony as unreliable is if we could properly
challenge the speaker 'How do you know?' The anomaly is this: if we do not regard gossip as
generally unreliable, how come it would not be out of place in many, if not all, of these cases for
the hearer to raise the 'How do you know?' question. The answer is evident: The confidential or
secretive nature of gossip. You would not be asking 'How do you know?' as a challenge to the
veracity of the speaker in gossiping, but as a query as to how he obtained the information.
This last observation in regard to secrecy leads me to a typical feature of gossip, one that
you readily import into the above examples. This feature implies that gossip could not serve
gossipers' purposes were it believed or found unreliable. The feature that their characterization
overlooks is this: gossipers typically want credit for the information they offer. They seek credit
for inside information, and credit from the recipient for letting him in on secret or confidential or
private information. (The closest they come is to note that the gossiper purports to have
'privileged information' and that: (Privileged information is information to which S (purports to)
has [have?] unique access.)
But speakers can only gain this credit if what they affirm--the gossip asserted--is true, on
the assumption, which is commonly satisfied, that the recipient or audience or hearer will soon be
able to verify the truth of the gossip. Indeed, to get the credit they seek, especially given the
ethical dubiousness of their speech-act, gossipers should impose on themselves, as hearer impose
on them, higher than usual standards of veracity.
Since F&K take it as so evident that gossip is 'on its face' unreliable, it is unsurprising
that they provide almost no grounds or evidence that even purport to support it. The closest to
direct support they offer also borrows from Bergmann:
...it can hardly be the case that S has carefully investigated the factual basis for what S has
to say about V's privileged affairs and still have exercised acceptable respect for V's
privacy.
But this is wrong about conversational practice on two counts: It implicitly holds that one cannot
assert something without having "carefully investigated" it, and that one cannot know of
someone's "privileged affairs" without having already invaded someone's privacy.
On the former count, I do not reject the condition of careful investigation because I think
ordinary assertion meets low standards. Pivotal to my account of belief is an elaboration on the
claim defended by Unger and Williamson that assertion requires knowing. My point is rather that
knowing does not require careful investigation. If a stranger asks me if Oregon is north of
California, I answer 'yes' readily, without investigation. I do not check available maps. The
stranger accepts my assertion because he takes it that I would not assert it unless I knew it.
More pertinently, to get to F&K's second point that S cannot obtain privileged
information without invading privacy, take any of examples 1-9 above e.g. 2. Marcia and Gary
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are splitting up, you can easily imagine that this information is obtained by the speaker from a
close friend of Marcia and Gary's. No careful investigation or invasion of privacy in obtaining it.
Nevertheless, the speaker can assert it as something he knows. The invasion--the gossipiness-comes in the speaker's spreading it, knowing that it is a private and delicate matter, not in how
the speaker obtains it.
I would add that any requirement for careful investigation, over and above the readily
satisfied requirements for knowledge would destroy the great informational value of
communication. That requirement is enough to maintain the understanding that K&F reject:
truthfulness is a background condition supporting the possibility of human condition
[communication?].
Turn now to the part of F&K's characterization that gossip involves a mutual recognition
and even consent to the gossip, and so on their view, to its epistemic unreliability. The opening
quotation from F&K is a flat-out assertion that everyone knows of gossip's unreliability, and later
they make it clear that when we gossip we so recognize it:
The communicative character of gossip is essentially manifest and would in many cases
be avowed by persons participating in gossip conversations by such frank confessions as
`We're gossiping about the Dean; want to join us?'
But this claim--not just that gossip is essentially manifest, but that its unreliability is as well--is
simply incompatible with their objection to Coady, which also implicity would apply to my view,
as well as, though less so, Fricker. For if everyone knows this, if it is mutual, the default is
overruled, and so there is no requirement of acceptance. (Here there is some comparison with
tact. When you ask me how I like your new tie, and I reply 'it's nice,' the social setting is
governed by a relaxed demand for truthfulness, and correspondingly such evaluative remarks are
not taken literally, at least in retrospect. (Adler, 1997).)
But this last claim of F&K's as to the manifest nature of gossip and its unreliability, as
well as gossiping as an activity, lead me to suspect that F&K have conflated gossip in various
ways with rumor and bullshitting. This hypothesis would explain the extreme disparity in
judgments--they take gossip's unreliability as obvious and manifest, whereas I take it as evident
and necessary that it is not, a judgment with which I hope you concur.
While gossip and rumor frequently go together, they are distinguishable. With rumor you
care to spread invasive or harmful information. But you do not care to be identified with it and,
so correlatively, to stand behind its truthfulness. I have observed that the opposite is typical of
gossip. Bullshitting or bull sessions, as discussed by Frankfurt (1988), involves keeping a social
conversational activity alive, where there is little concern for truth. (Individual bullshitting or
bullshit involves misrepresentation without the effort or design of lying or misleading.) There is
indifference to truth or reality, and that fits with what F&K say of gossiping as a social activity
and of its manifest recognition. But, as I have been at pains to argue, gossip itself, unlike social
bullshitting, is asserted as true under normal standards, standards which are regularly met or at
least are not markedly violated.
Let me then end by emphasizing these distinctions, even if by falsely suggesting a
determinateness of the data and a tightness of usage, along the following dimensions:
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A. The governing presumption of the conversational exchange is truthfulness (reliability). (The
purported purpose is primarily informational.).
B. The speaker seeks to have himself identified as the source (of his assertion).
C. The speaker intends to meet condition (A). (Or condition (A) is not noticeably unsatisfied.)
So to summarize:
1. Gossip generally satisfies (A), (B), and (C).
2. Everyday assertion satisfies (A) and (C). But satisfaction of (B) is highly variable.
3. Rumor generally satisfies (A), not (B), and not (C).
4. Social bullshitting or bull sessions satisfy none of (A), (B), or (C).
5. Lying, intentional deceiving, and misleading crucially depend upon condition (A). They do not
satisfy (B) (indeed, usually anti-B), and their concern for (A) leads to their anti-C aim. (Bullshit
falls in here, although the anti-C aim is satisfied only in a way indifferent to truth. It is a relaxed
form of pretentious or pompous misrepresentation.)
Further distinctions would be needed to properly sort tact, politeness, humbug, and slander, and
to distinguish among the various kind of misrepresentation under 5.
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